


ROK Military Policy Recommendations toward North Korea

by

Colonel Kisoo Bae
Republic of Korean Army



United States Army War College
Class of 2012

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ROK MILITARY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TOWARD NORTH KOREA

by

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The Republic of Korea (ROK) policy toward North Korea dramatically changed during the administration of President Kim Dae-jung and continued for 10 years through the Roh Moo-hyun Administration. This unilateral policy was based on West German Chancellor Willy Brant's Ostpolitik, or Eastern Policy, toward East Germany and was based on the belief that open, positive actions toward North Korea might persuade the northern regime to change its hostile policy. In fact, North Korea did not change its strategy or identity, but instead carried out hostile actions. The North Korean navy attacked one of South Korea's warships on 15 June 1999 and again on 29 June 2002. Even last year (2011), North Korea's navy attacked a South Korean warship and fired artillery against Yeonpyung Island. But the ROK armed forces showed restraint and did not take aggressive measures against North Korea. This military policy was a part of the political policy. This paper traces the history of the ROK policy toward the north, explains the problem caused by mingling military with political policy, and recommends that South Korea military forces maintain a consistent policy to take immediate action to respond to North Korea's aggressive provocations regardless of political policy.

ROK MILITARY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TOWARD NORTH KOREA

We will complete our counter-provocation plan this year to establish effective response mechanism against North Korean provocations. It will display our strong willingness to strike back if North Korea carries out provocations and to stage effective joint response (with the U.S.) not only in the case of an all-out war but of provocations.¹

—Defense Minister Kim, Kwan-Jin

The number of North Korea's military provocations against the Republic of Korea (ROK) has reached approximately 221 since the Korean War cease fire was signed in 1953². On the other hand, South Korea has consistently refrained from provocations against North Korea, instead seeking peace and stability in the Korean peninsula with confidence and with a determination to avoid a second Korean War. South Korea has taken this defensive position because of its concern that provocative actions could escalate to unintended war. South Korea has focused on economic development and its military policy toward North Korea was integrated into the political policy of the government. Since different political parties with very different attitudes and policies toward North Korea have held power during the past two decades, the political policy, and, therefore, the military policy toward the north has changed in accordance with the views of the ruling party. This has led to an inconsistent approach to responding to northern military provocations and has had a bad effect on morale and military effectiveness in the south. This paper traces the history of the ROK policy toward the north, explains the problem caused by mingling military with political policy, and recommends that South Korea military forces maintain a consistent policy to take immediate action to respond to North Korea's aggressive provocations regardless of political policy.

By the end of the Cold War, Germany was reunified as one country, but the Cold War still remains in the divided Korean Peninsula. Republic of Korean government have sought ways to reunify the country without war. Using West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, or Eastern Policy, as a model, South Korean President Roh Tae-woo began a Nordpolitik, or "Northward Policy" to normalize relations with the communist satellites of the Soviet Union in order to end Cold War on the Korean Peninsula.³ In 1990, the South Korean government extended the Northward Policy toward China and the Soviet Union in order to create conditions favorable for reunification. These measures bore fruit in improved relations with those countries. But North Korea's isolation deepened after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when they lost their active supporters.⁴ ROK President Kim Dae-joong concluded that West Germany's Eastern Policy had a decisive role in the process of German unification and in 1998 he promoted a "Sunshine Policy" of openness toward the North to try to change its attitudes.⁵ The South Korean government expected that North Korea would be changed and their society would be opened through the Sunshine Policy and so they pursued this policy for 10 years. But the North Koreans instead utilized this opportunity to strengthen their military power and regime. Furthermore, North Korea provoked South Korea's navy during the World Cup event, which was hosted by Korea and Japan in 2002⁶. North Korea's navy launched a preemptive strike against a South Korean warship in the Yellow Sea. In doing this, the North Korean Armed Forces did not consider South Korea's Sunshine Policy. They just conducted the provocations as they had done in the past. The South Korean government, pursuing the Sunshine Policy,

also did not give clear directions to the military to take strong measures against North Korea's provocations.

Although South Korea pursued the Sunshine Policy for 10 years, it did not achieve unification, or even a significant change in North Korea. The policy did not have the effect that West Germany did through its Eastern Policy toward East Germany. Although Germany became unified after the collapse of the Soviet Union, South and North Korea remain as they were. This is because North Korea's regime is completely different from that of the East Germany. North Korea has a unique national structure and system based on a Military First Policy, hereditary power, deification of its leader, strict control of the population, and thorough isolation from outside.

The North Korean regime has provoked South Korea in order to maximize their national interests and to gain more support from South Korea. South Korea's military leaders did not take immediate and strong measures against North Korea's provocation because they followed the political policy lead. This situation continued even after the Lee Myung-bak administration came into office with a harder line against North Korea. When North Korea's navy attacked the South Korean warship *Chun-an* using a torpedo from submarine⁷, many senior military leaders who did not take appropriate measures against North Korea were reprimanded. Newly appointed Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin declared that ROK Armed Forces would retaliate with all suitable measures if North Korea provoked again. This new and different policy was in accordance with the political policy of the ruling party and president.

Historical Background of Military Policy toward North Korea

North Korea has a clear military policy toward South Korea.⁸ On the other hand, South Korea has no consistent military policy toward North Korea. South Korea's

military policy had been changed depending on the policy toward North Korea of the government in power. Without a military policy independent from the government policy, South Korea's military leaders have responded to provocations in an ad hoc manner according to the intentions of the politicians. South Korea's military policy has been different with each government depending on the tendency of the President.

The very first government's president, Syngman Rhee, regarded North Korea as an enemy and declared that ROK Armed Forces would advance toward North Korea to reunify the Korean peninsula. He tried to reunify Korea during the Korean War, exerting pressure on Korea's United Nations Command allies and even ordering the ROK military leaders not to sign the cease-fire agreement.⁹ He responded strongly against North Korea's provocations using military forces while he educated the population with anti-communism. Furthermore, he detected communists behind-the-scenes and got rid of them to defend freedom and democracy.

President Park Chung-hee, who came to power in a coup, prepared strong measures to deal with North Korea's provocations. He strongly urged retaliation when North Korea's Army brutally killed two U.S. officers using ax handles at the Joint Security Area of Panmunjom on August 18, 1976.¹⁰ He designated anti-communism as the first national policy slogan and strengthened the nation's anti-communist stance. In 1968, a raid against the Presidential Blue House (the name of the residence and administrative offices of the president) by North Korean special forces stimulated Park Chung-hee to reinforce the military by creating huge reserve forces. He intended to build up stronger military forces than those of North Korea through economic development. In particular, he maintain a strong alliance relationship with the United

States to counter balance North Korea's military capability, and he dispatched military forces to Vietnam to demonstrate his policy that South Korea will fight against communism anywhere in the world. As he achieved his goals of economic development and military build-up, he then suggested robust dialogue with North Korea from a position of strength.¹¹ In 1972, South and North agreed to three principles to reunify Korea: self-reliance, peace, and national unity. A hotline between the two Koreas was installed and in official media, the title of "North Korea" replaced the former term, "northern puppet regime" in order to reduce hostility.¹² Park Chung-hee was prepared to take these measures because he had the confidence of economic and military superiority to North Korea.

The two presidents from the military, Chun Du-whan and Roh Tae-woo, who came after Park Chung-hee were the successors to his military policy. They regularly visited the military units and delegated the authority to respond to North Korea's provocations to the field commanders. But in 1998, an unprecedented political change took place. Kim Dae-jung, who had been the leader of the opposition party, won the presidential election and dramatically changed the military policy toward North Korea. His main goal was to change North Korea by adopting a policy of actively seeking contact and cooperation with the North. This policy was called the "Sunshine Policy," referring to an old story in which the sun and wind contested which one could make a man take off his coat. The wind blew hard, but the man only wrapped his coat tighter. When the sun shone, however, the man became warm and took off his coat. The warmth of the South Korea policy was supposed to make the North take off its coat and become friendlier and less threatening to the South.¹³ Although Kim Dae-jung said that

North Korean provocations would not be tolerated, in fact, because he wanted to conduct the “Sunshine Policy” of openness toward North Korea, he was passive about the military reaction toward North Korea’s provocations. In particular, he asked the Navy not to respond strongly against North Korea’s attempt to violate the Northern Limit Line (NLL), which is the unilaterally imposed operational boundary in the sea.¹⁴ He did not want military conflict between the South and North Korean navies to impact on the Sunshine Policy. Roh Moo-hyun, who succeeded Kim Dae-jung in 1993, continued to adhere to the Sunshine Policy. He persisted in advocating this approach even though North Korea did not change its policy with the ultimate goal to reunify the Korean Peninsula using military power. Both of these presidents underestimated North Korea’s military capability and disregarded their intention.¹⁵

Because South Korea’s military policy is tied to the government policy toward North Korea, it has been restrained from conducting a consistent policy to defend the Republic of Korea’s territory and people. Of course, the military should strongly support the government policy, but in South Korea, the military is inhibited in its primary mission of national defense by the policies of the party in power. The political leaders have not taken into consideration that the two countries are in a special situation of a long-lasting, but temporary and unstable cease fire, not in a normal relationship of stability and peace.

The characteristics of South Korea’s military policy toward North Korea are as follows: First, because regional stability is essential to South Korea for economic development, the ROK tends to be relatively passive and defensive compare to North Korea’s military policy toward South Korea. This gives North Korea the military initiative.

Although, North Korea carried out military provocations over 221 times against South Korea's military and the U.S. forces in Korea, no preemptive action has been taken by South Korea's armed forces and the reaction to those provocations has been generally mild. Secondly, South Korea's military policy toward North Korea has been greatly influenced by political trends. In particular, the Sunshine Policy as the approach to North-South Korea reconciliation has over a period of 10 years dominated military policy toward North Korea. North Korea has taken advantage of South Korea's weakness because they know that South Korea's military leaders are heavily reliant on the political situation. The North has carried out provocations at the places and times they wanted in order to achieve their goals and demonstrate their brutality.

Peculiarities of the North Korean Regime and Military Policy toward South Korea

North Korea has not changed its system and identity since Kim Il-Sung founded North Korea in 1948. As Sun Tzu mentioned, "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril."¹⁶ Military people understand the enduring relevance and truth of this ancient motto and the members of the ROK military realize that it is imperative that they should know the enemy, North Korea.

Like other satellite countries in Eastern Europe after World War II, the North Korean regime was imposed by an external power, the Soviet Union, not by the people of North Korea. But North Korea is totally different from the Eastern European countries in terms of its national system, leadership, structure of government, and way of life. North Korea is a dynastic state or feudal dynasty. If we look for the commonality of

North Korea and those historical dynasties, we can see that in both cases one person, the leader, has all the power and is succeeded by the leader's son. Unlike the situation in democratic nations, the people have no right to vote to choose the leader's successor. North Korea is really a unique country in the world. Kim Il-sung, who was a major in the Soviet Union Army, adapted a military system to North Korea in order to rule strongly. He could not rule North Korea using traditional methods of government because he had no power base or public support. The North Korean regime continues to be characterized by a one-party dictatorship with power held by a succession of members of Kim Il-sung's family. The Kim family regime sternly and brutally enforces a "military first" policy. The leader and the military are two pillars leading North Korea. The leader uses the military to maintain his regime and the military supports the leader. Kim Il-sung's successor and son, Kim Jong-il, held the official position of head of state as the chairman of the National Defense Commission.¹⁷

Kim Il-sung ruled North Korea for 46 years as a dictator and strengthened his regime by removing his political rivals. Kim Il-sung witnessed de-Stalinization and decided to hand over his power to his son, Kim Jong-il. Kim Jong-il designated his son, Kim Jong-eun, and as his successor just like a king or emperor in a feudal dynasty. The North Korean leaders have brainwashed North Koreans to worship Kim Il-sung like God in order to maintain their regime.

Due to these circumstances, North Korea's military policy is connected to Kim Il-sung's Juche ideology.¹⁸ There are three major pillars of the Juche ideology: Political Independence, Economic Self-sustenance, and Self-reliance in Defense. To implement this, they used three slogans: strengthening the revolutionary capability of North Korea

itself, enlarging communism in South Korea, and acquiring revolutionary capability from international society.

The Labor Party is the only party in North Korea and has a greater power than the government. The members of the Labor Party have a special privileges, status, and advantages. The Labor Party is another pillar to support Kim Jung-eun, together with the military. Kim Jung-eun controls the Labor Party through the military and uses the military to control the Labor Party. As the Chairman of the National Defense Commission of the Labor Party, he rules North Korea and military leaders in the Labor Party are involved in politics.

The “Military First” policy is a major pillar to sustain the stability of North Korea. North Korea maintains 1.1 million combat troops out of a population of 24 million. It is an abnormal condition that 5% of the population is members of the military. Kim Jung-il gave a special position to the military and wanted to utilize military forces as a last resort to protect his regime. Kim Jung-eun continues this policy.

For this reason, Kim Jung-eun cannot open North Korean markets as China did. He knows what benefit North Korea can gain from open market, but he also knows that opening markets would also give the North Korean people contact with the outside world, demonstrate the reality of North Korea’s poverty and isolation, and undermine his regime’s control, which depends on isolation. Therefore, Kim Jung-eun has very limited options to rule North Korea. North Korea has serious vulnerabilities in its ruling system with the possibility of sudden collapse. For this reason, he depends on the military to protect his safety as well as that of his regime against domestic plots and popular uprisings like those of the Arab spring. Although South Korea carried out the Sunshine

Policy toward North Korea in order to change the North's isolationist policies and to open their society, North Korea has remained unchanged and has not altered its identity, its policies, or its objectives.

Since East Germany gradually changed its policy in response to the West German Eastern Policy of openness toward East Germany, observers may ask why a similar policy has not worked in Korea. What are the essential differences between East Germany and North Korea? The main difference is that the East German people knew what was going on outside, and their leaders were willing to hand over power to the people.

The goal of North Korea's military policy toward South Korea is to reunify the Korean Peninsula as a communist country under the slogan of the "Four Military Policy."¹⁹ North Korea intends to occupy the whole of the Korean Peninsula through a second Korean War and create a unified communist country as described in the constitution of North Korea. Given these goals and the reality of the threats to the survival of the regime, which would collapse if its people were exposed to the reality of the outside world, it is inevitable that Kim Jong-eun pursues the Military First Policy to maintain his unstable regime and insure his survival and the survival of his family regime. The occupation of South Korea is a goal requiring the maintenance of both strong military forces and the means to mobilize and control the North Korean people. North Korean military leaders have a tendency to carry out robust military actions against South Korea to show their loyalty to their leader. Historically, North Korea's provocations increased when Kim Jong-il was designated as the successor of his father. The same thing happened after Kim Jong-il designated his son as his successor.

The reasons why North Korea has carried out provocative acts against South Korea are as follows: Firstly, military tension between South and North provides internal cohesion. The perceived threat from South Korea (demonstrated by the prevalence of military clashes) causes the people of North Korea to support the regime through fear. Thus, the confrontation and tension are necessary as means to rule North Korea. North Korea regards the South Korean government as the follower of the United States and not an independent country. Secondly, provocation is a means to threaten South Korea to get more assistance from the South. The Sunshine Policy played into North Korean hands in this regard. The South Korean people sought peace and stability on the Peninsula through the provision of goods and benefits to the North with the expectation that these measures would gain peace in return. That expectation led to the Sunshine Policy, but North Korea has accepted the benefits and then continued to carry out provocations sporadically even while South Korea exercised the Sunshine Policy.

Sunshine Policy and Military Policy toward North Korea

Kim Dae-jung based his Sunshine Policy on the Eastern Policy of West Germany believing that Korea would thereby become a unified country just as West and East Germany became unified. Comparing those two policies, Germany's Eastern Policy effectively shaped the environment, while a similar policy was not so effective in Korea. Most political leaders who supported the Sunshine Policy overlooked the differences between East Germany and North Korea. East Germany was not a closed family-ruled state and the East German people knew what was going on outside.

Kim Dae-jung was sure that the Sunshine Policy would change North Korea and bring stability and peace to North East Asia. He believed that the Sunshine Policy was the only policy that could reconcile North Korea and provide the impetus for great

progress toward the unification of Korea. The major purpose of the Sunshine Policy was to support North Korea's economy in order to enhance the level of economy and culture. The real benefit of the Sunshine Policy was expected to be a reduction in North Korea's aggression at the expense of reunification. The total amount of money provided North Korea during the Sunshine Policy was 2 trillion 702.8 billion won (\$ 2.7 billion) by the Kim Dae-jung administration and 6 trillion 677.7 billion won (\$ 6.6 billion).²⁰ The problem was that cash flowed into North Korea and almost all the money was used to fund the reign of Kim Jung-il, not to help the starving, poverty-stricken people. Both governments gained some transient benefits, such as a summit meeting between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jung-il and some carefully-orchestrated family reunions. North Korea maximized its publicity toward the South Korean people during those events, in hope of persuading the South Korean people that they took place through the mercy of Kim Jung-il.

North Korea responded with weapons, not appreciation. In 1998, a North Korea submarine infiltrated the East Sea and in 2009 they launched the Daepo-dong long range missile ²¹. In 1999, the North Korean navy attacked South Korea's warships and they declared the neutralization of the NLL.²² In 2000, North Korean warships attacked again in the Yellow Sea while the 17th World Cup event was taking place in South Korea and Japan. In 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and conducted its first nuclear test in 2005. It carried out its second nuclear test in 2007.

The South Korean people eventually woke up from the illusion of the Sunshine Policy. Their expectation and hopes for reunification were shattered and they started

criticizing this policy. This was an important factor in the election of Lee Myung-bak, who promised a harder line.

North Korea was very upset when the Lee Myung-bak administration discarded the Sunshine Policy. They retaliated by attacking the warship, *Chunan*, and by firing artillery against Yeunpyung Island in the Western Sea.²³ Furthermore, when ROK military forces stationed in the North West Islands held a military exercise in order to increase combat readiness, North Korea threatened to turn the Blue House residence of the President into a sea of fire.²⁴

For 10 years, the ROK military was prevented from taking strong measures against North Korea's provocations. Military morale dropped significantly and soldiers fell into ideological turmoil over the issues of national security and response to the enemy. The activities and events conducted by progressive politicians visiting North Korea brought further disappointment to the soldiers deployed along the border between South and North Korea. They asked, "why I am here to protect and guard my country's border" when TV broadcasts showed North and South Korean leaders hugging each other during their meeting in Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea.

In addition, the period of active duty military service has been shortened gradually and now it became 21 months. The quality of soldiers has been degraded because soldiers who had mental and physical problems were recruited. Twenty one months are too short a period for them to become combat-ready troops. Most officers and noncommissioned officers are spending a lot of time taking care of the soldiers who need care.

President Kim Dae-jung prohibited preemptive attacks against North Korean forces, banned actions that might escalate to war, and forbade measures to secure the NLL.²⁵ When the North Korean navy penetrated the NLL, South Korean Navy ships just tried to push them away in accordance with the directions of the President, who is the Supreme Commander of ROK Armed Forces. Even though the South Korean Navy won the battle in the Yellow Sea, Kim Dae-Jung fired the fleet commander, Admiral Park Jung-seung, because North Korea demanded the punishment of the commander.²⁶ South Korean navy lost a hero and competent admiral.

Furthermore, during the 10 years of the Sunshine Policy, many ROK units were deactivated according to a military reformation plan that decreased combat power to 180,000 troops regardless of the North Korean threat.²⁷

Lee Myung-Bak Administration's Policy toward North Korean and his Military Policy

Lee Myung-bak abandoned the Sunshine Policy as soon as he became President.²⁸ Thereafter, all trade and relationships between South and North Korea were suspended except for the Kaesong Industrial Complex. President Lee then announced a new policy toward North Korea, which is an assistance plan until North Korea's GNP per capita reaches \$ 3000 under the condition of giving up their nuclear program. This new policy is called the "MB doctrine," or the "Denuclearization·Opening·3000" proposal²⁹. It is a condition-based policy that depends on North Korea's actions. This is completely different from the Sunshine Policy. Nothing will happen as long as North Korea does not meet certain conditions.

It is very fortunate that the Kaesong Industrial Complex continues to operate smoothly so far. It became a hope for the relationship between South and North Korea because both sides benefitted from the enterprise. North Korea does not want to lose

the \$ 5 million monthly salary of the North Korean Kaesong laborers. Also it is not easy for South Korea to close down the Kaesong Industrial Complex because 123 companies have invested huge amounts of money. If it is closed down, the government will have to compensate all the money lost by the companies. Positive aspects of the Kaesong Industrial Complex are as follows: Firstly, 48,000 North Korean workers realize the reality of South Korea through their contract with the South Korean companies. Secondly, it relieves tensions because it located along the avenue of approach of enemy's main attack.

The military policy of Lee Myung-bak, which is led by Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin, is to retaliate against North Korean provocations. President Lee Myung-bak has declared that ROK forces will strike the point of attack as well as their supporting bases using all resources. Therefore the tension between South and North is very high and it is not an ideal situation for the stability of Korean Peninsula. Of course, this government's military policy is tied to its political policy. In the official ROK government White Book, this government, unlike the previous governments, clearly described North Korea as the enemy.³⁰

There is an assistant secretary for defense under the presidential secretary for foreign and security affairs, who comes from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³¹ The assistant secretary cannot directly give counsel to the president about security issues without making a report to his boss, the presidential secretary for foreign and security affairs. Security issues have been neglected in the Blue House for this reason. In the past, the presidential secretary for foreign and security affairs came from the Ministry of Defense, but now most of them came from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Among the

four presidents after Roh Tae-woo, Roh Moo-hyun was only person who fulfilled his military service.³² Most of them were not well-versed in the security issue for this reason.

This is why we need a strong military organization in the presidential office.

Military leaders often act according to the situation in order to gain promotion. The criteria for promotion to be a general in the Korean Military is not always ability. For this reason, military leaders can not pursue the military policy that they want to execute according to their plan.

Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated that South Korea's military policy toward North Korea has been heavily dependent on the tendency of the ruling government administration. South Korea's military policy toward North Korea has been inconsistent for several reasons. First, because political leaders utilized the national defense issue in order to win elections. Second, South Korea's military leaders shifted their responsibility to the political leaders. Third, the Korean people did not have a correct understanding of this issue.

North Korea was in a superior position in the relationship between South and North Korea after the Korean War, but this situation was reversed when South Korea gained economic superiority in 1980. As soon as North Korea realized this changed situation, they began to develop a nuclear weapons program to regain an advantage and have used this program in brinksmanship tactics to gain concessions, to put pressure on the South, and to counter ROK military strength to achieve their objectives. The ruling Kim family under three different leaders has never neglected the military as a final card to use. One way that the North has used the military is to carry out provocative actions against the Republic of Korea.

Over the years, different South Korean administrations have taken very different approaches to dealing with North Korea, and the military policy regarding dealing with North Korean military provocations has been inconsistent, following the lead of the political policy. During the 10 years of the Sunshine Policy, as South Korea tried to influence the North through soft words and actions, and took a moderate approach to dealing with Northern provocations, Kim Jung-il was able to manipulate the political situation of South Korea by using military provocations as well as dialogue. He was able to do this because ROK military policy was strongly connected with the Sunshine Policy. Thus, the Sunshine Policy for 10 years negatively impacted on South Korea's military policy. Political leaders downplayed the security issue to win elections without considering the reality and without understanding and considering the enemy's strategy.

South Korea's Military Service motto is that "the ROK Armed Military Forces are the people's armed forces consisting of the children of the Korean people in order to protect democracy, maintain peace, and defend the nation"³³. ROK Armed Forces exist for the people of the ROK and our nation, not for the benefit of some specific group or someone in a political party. Therefore, national defense issues should not be used for political purpose and should be independent from the political policy until North Korea changes its policy positively.

Recommendations

First, ROK political leaders from all parties should declare mutually agreed upon military policy toward North Korea to ensure consistent action against North Korean provocations until we achieve the reunification of Korean Peninsula. Politicians should recognize that military policy should not be subject to political policy and should not be changed and modified as the political policy changes. It is necessary to deal with this

issue on the basis of bipartisan cooperation and guarantee that the military can pursue a consistent policy toward North Korea. The single most important factor is the public opinion of the Korean people.

Second, the military staff in the presidential office should be reinforced to support the military policy toward North Korea. Third, the military leadership must try to be independent from the political leaders and must speak with one voice on this issue.

Civilian control of the military is significant in Korea because the Korean people have experienced military rule. However, the security of ROK is also important because civilian control is meaningless without ensuring security. Considering the unique and dangerous situation on the Korean peninsula, a consistent military policy ensures the security of ROK until reunification of the nation takes place.

Endnotes

¹ "US agree to complete joint operational plan against NK," *Korea Times*, Korea, October 28, 2011, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/10/116_97490.html (accessed November 20, 2011).

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⁴ Due to its isolation, North Korea tried to improve its relationship with the United States and joined the UN in 1991 together with South Korea. *Ibid.*, 132.

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⁹ Out of the four sides with military representation in the truce talks -- the United States, China, North Korea, and South Korea -- the South’s leadership said from the very beginning that they would not sign any agreement because their ultimate goal was the unification of Korea under a legitimate government, that is, under their own government. If it signed an agreement with a self-proclaimed communist puppet regime and its militant group, that would be a complete disgrace. “The end of Korean War cease-fire- Does it matter?”, Radio free Europe Radio Liberty, March 5, 2012, http://www.rferl.org/content/The_End_Of_The_Korean_War_Cease_Fire/1747745.html (accessed March 5, 2012).

¹⁰ When the ax murder incident occurred, Park Chung-hee asked his staff to bring his helmet and boots to be ready to retaliate against North Korea immediately after he received the report on this incident. He mobilized reserve forces and ordered them to be ready to attack North Korea. The situation then went to be back to normal after Kim Il-sung said “this incident was regrettable.” “Park Chung-hee’s reaction North Korea’ ax murder incident (박정희 대통령의 북한 도끼만행사건에 대한 대응 방법),” Free North Korea Network, November 24, 2010, <http://www.fnkradio.com/board.php?board=qqqforum&command=body&no=8331&page=286> (accessed March 2, 2012).

¹¹ President Park described his philosophy and policies in Park Chung-hee, *Our Nation’s Path: Ideology of Social Reconstruction*, Seoul: Hollym Publishers, 1970). A more critical view is provided by Mark Clifford, *Troubled Tiger: Businessmen, Bureaucrats, and Generals in South Korea*, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994.

¹² The text of the 1972 South-North Korean Joint Communiqué is available from the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1972/1972-1-6.htm> (accessed March 18 2012).

¹³ A positive view of the “Sunshine Policy” is presented in “Sunshine Policy in a Nutshell,” Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/news/skorea/1999/reunification22.html> (accessed 18 March 2012).

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¹⁴ The Northern Limit Line has existed for many decades, and both South and North Korea have acknowledged that a practical separation line exists in the waters off the east and west coasts of the Korean peninsula. However, South Korea claims the NLL as the legal boundary, while the DPRK claims a line much further to the south, which encompasses many islands effectively occupied by the South. Clashes in the disputed waters of the Yellow Sea have happened before, especially during crab fishing season. In 1999 and 2002, skirmishes resulted in casualties on both sides. “Northern Limit Line (NLL) West Sea Naval Engagements”, Global Security, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/nll.htm> (accessed March 4, 2012).

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¹⁶ Samuel B. Griffith, *Sun Tzu, The Art of War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press Paperback, 1971: 84.

¹⁷ North Koreans called Kim Jung-il “the Supreme Leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” which was not an official position. “North Korean heir called ‘supreme leader’,” Silive.com, December 24, 2011, http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2011/12/north_korean_heir_called_supre.html (accessed March 4, 2012).

¹⁸ Juche means “self-reliance” and is a term created by Kim Il-sung, grandfather of current leader Kim Jung-eun. In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, “Juche” refers specifically to a political thesis of Kim Il-sung, the Juche Idea, that identifies the Korean masses as the masters of the country’s development. “Juche,” Wikipedia, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juche> (accessed March 4, 2012), provides a good summary. Kim Jung-il’s own explanation of Juche is at “On the Juche Idea,” http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/062nd_issue/98092410.htm#4.%20THE%20GUIDING%20PRINCIPLES%20OF%20THE%20JUCHE%20IDEA, (accessed March 20, 2012).

¹⁹ North Korea built this military policy in 1962. The key points of the policy are; first, making all soldiers to be cadre; second, modernization of the Armed Forces; third, militarization of all people; fourth, fortification of territory. “North Korea’s four major policy”, Naver encyclopedia, <http://100.naver.com/100.nhn?docid=82911> (accessed March 4, 2012).

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